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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
trative convenience. Giving an illegitimate child the procedural right to
prove what cannot be proved while presuming dependency exists for other
children when often it does not exist does not seem reasonable. In Mis-
souri, the courts should not hesitate to utilize the equitable adoption doc-
trine to protect these children who are injured for convenience's sake.
EDWARD F. FORD III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEADLY FORCE TO
ARREST NONVIOLENT FLEEING FELONS
Mattis v. Schnarrl*
Police encountered eighteeen year old Michael Mattis and a seventeen
year old companion burglarizing the office of a golf driving range. The
youths fled and the two police officers gave chase. Shouts to halt were
ignored. The police were losing ground. Officer Marek, believing the use
of his firearm to be necessary to effect the arrest, fired one shot in the
direction of Mattis. The bullet struck Mattis in the back of the head and
killed him.
Missouri statutes2 permit law enforcement officers to use deadly force3
when reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, provided
the felon is first notified he is under arrest. Michael Mattis' father brought
a civil rights action 4 against both police officers, alleging that the killing
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection Clauses of the federal constitution. The trial court's dismissal
for lack of standing5 was reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.6
On remand the trial court upheld the constitutionality of the stautes.7 The
* After this issue went to press, this case was vacated for lack of standing sub
nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 97 S. Ct. 1739 (1977) (per curiam). As the Court did not
reach the merits, the constitutional questions raised in the Eighth Court opinion
remain unresolved.
1. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976).
2. Section 544.190, RSMo 1969, provides: "If, after notice of the intention to
arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all
necessary means to effect the arrest." Section 559.040 provides that homicide is
justifiable "[w]hen necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and means
to apprehend any person for any felony committed. ... See note 9 infra for cases
construing these statutes.
3. "Deadly force" as used herein means "force which the actor uses with the
purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death
or serious bodily harm." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970); § 537.080, RSMo 1969.
5. Mattis v. Kissling, Civil No. 72-Civ.(3) (E.D. Mo., Jan. 16, 1973).
6. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
7. Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
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court of appeals again reversed, holding that the statutes, as applied to a
nonviolent fleeing felon, violated due process:
We hold the statutes unconstitutional as applied to arrests in
which an officer uses deadly force against a fleeing felon who has
not used deadly force in the commission of the felony and whom
the officer does not reasonably believe will use deadly force
against the officer or others if not immediately apprehended.
8
The Missouri statutes have been construed 9 as codifying the common
law rule' ° that deadly force could be used if necessary to effect the arrest of
a felony suspect, but could never be used to arrest a suspected misdemean-
ant. Because all common law felonies were punishable by death, the use of
deadly force to effect arrest was viewed as a mere acceleration of the penal
process." Today this rationale is a blatant anachronism. Capital punish-
ment is generally restricted to the most heinous felonies; moreover, many
felonies unknown to the common law have been created by statute thereby
broadening the scope of the privilege. Nevertheless, the common law
"fleeing felon rule" remains the law in over half of the American jurisdic-
tions.' 2 Some states have attempted to ameliorate the harshness of the
fleeing felon rule by applying it only to certain specified felonies.' 3 Several
others have adopted the Model Penal Code approach, which authorizes the
use of deadly force to effect arrest in two situations: (1) where the underly-
ing felony involved the use of deadly force, or (2) where the felon's escape
would pose a substantial threat to life."
8. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1976).
9. Manson v. Wabash R.R., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1960); State v. Nolan, 354
Mo. 980, 192 S.W.2d 1016 (1946). See also PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE FOR STATE OF
MISSOURI § 8.080, Comment (1973).
10. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 56 (1972). The common law
rule encompasses both the criminal law of justification and the tort law of privilege.
11. See Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 109, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (1902);
Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 361, 365 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Deadly Force to
Arrest].
12. See Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory
Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914 (1975); Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 11, at
368-69; Note, Justifiable Use of Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutory Survey, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 67 (1970).
13. For a list of these jurisdictions, see Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1012
n.10 (8th Cir. 1976).
14. Section 3.07 of the MODEL PENAL CODE, (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
provides in part:
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section
unless . . . the actor believes that:
(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct includ-
ing the use or threatened use of deadly force; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause
death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.
The Proposed Missouri Criminal Code adds a third situation: where the person to
be arrested "is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon." § 8.080 (3)(b)(ii).
This appears to overlap with the Model Penal Code privileges.
1977]
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This note will examine the relative utility of various due process
principles and other constitutional limitations which arguably invalidate
the fleeing felon rule.
The fourteenth amendment mandates that no state shall deprive a
person of his life without due process of law. Due process in the criminal
context normally means a trial and its attendant procedural safeguards.'
5
However, if due process always requires a trial, an arresting officer could
never kill a criminal suspect, not even in self-defense. Nobody contends for
such a result. Under what circumstances, then, may a police officer kill a
criminal suspect without violating due process?
The outer perimeter of permissible police conduct is set by two broad
and overlapping due process principles: (1) police conduct may not "shock
the conscience,"' 16 and (2) police may not use excessive and unreasonable
force to arrest a criminal suspect.' 7 Both principles appear broad enough
to invalidate the fleeing felon rule as applied to nonviolent felons, but
courts have thus far declined to do so. For example, in Jones v. Marshall'1
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although indicating that the Model
Penal Code approach was "preferable," refused to hold that the common
law rule shocked the conscience. Similarly, in Smith v. Jones19 the court held
that deadly force was "not unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive" when
necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon.
In Mattis v. Schnarr the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored both
of these basic principles and effectively held that the Model Penal Code
approach is required by due process. The four-judge majority reached this
result by synthesizing two distinguishable due process theories.
At one point the court stated that an individual's life can be taken
without a trial only when the state's interests in public safety outweigh the
individual's interest in continued life.20 Under this approach, it is the
taking of life without a trial that necessitates a balancing of interests.
Most of the majority opinion, however, is premised upon the "funda-
mental right to life." Under the "fundamental right" theory, 21 it is the
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (self-representation); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (condemnation shall be rendered only after
trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel).
16. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach-pumping of
suspect); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (black suspect beat to death by
police).
17. E.g., Conklin v. Barfield, 334 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Jackson v.
Martin, 261 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1966); see Annot., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 519 (1969).
18. 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
19. 379 F. Supp. 201, 203 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd mem., 497 F.2d 924 (6th
Cir. 1974). However, in this case the felon placed the officer's life in danger.
20. 547 F.2d at 1019.
21. A statutory classification that infringes upon the exercise of a fundamental
right is unconstitutional unless the state can show that it is necessary to achieve
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implicit constitutional significance of life, rather than the lack of a trial, that
triggers strict judicial scrutiny of the competing interests.
Both due process theories require the court to balance the interests at
stake; hence, it is of little consequence which approach is followed in the
fleeing felon context, where the individual is deprived of both life and
trial.2 The "fundamental right" doctrine, however, is normally associated
with the Equal Protection Clause. The court in Mattis applied it in a due
process context, citing abortion 23 and irrebuttable presumption 24 cases for
the propriety of this approach. It is submitted that more tenable authority
for a balancing test can be found in due process cases involving property
seizures.
Although the state generally must afford a hearing to an individual
before seizing his property, United States Supreme Court cases establish
that a post-seizure hearing satisfies due process requirements in certain
extraordinary situations where the governmental need for summary action
outweighs the potential harm to the individual.25 Because life, like proper-
ty, is a protected due process interest, the same principle arguably applies
to limit the situations where the state can take a person's life without a
hearing. This would mean that a police officer could kill a fleeing felon
some compelling state interest. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right
to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreation). See also
notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
22. However, the theory chosen could be outcome-determinative in other
situations. For example, what if a nonviolent felon who has been tried and
convicted later attempts to escape from prison? Is the prison guard's privilege to
use deadly force to prevent his escape now unconstitutional? Under the fundamen-
tal right to life approach, the state would have to prove that the use of deadly force
is necessary to promote some compelling state interest. But if the competing
interests are only balanced when there has been no trial, the guard's privilege is free
from any due process problems.
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Recent United States Supreme Court cases have created the doctrine that
certain irrebuttable statutory presumptions violate due process. An individual ad-
versely affected by such a presumption must be afforded an opportunity to rebut
the existence of the fact conclusively presumed. In other words, the substantive rule
of law created by the irrebuttable presumption is constitutionally impermissible.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973). But cf., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (restricting the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine). See also Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
(seizure of yacht smuggling marijuana); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry; Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamins); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (seizure of assets to prevent bank failure); North American Cold Storage Co.
v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of unfit food); cf. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (no pre-termination hearing required for termina-
tion of Social Security disability benefits).
1977] 455
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only when the need for summary action outweighs the felon's interest in
staying alive.
The analogy, however, is not perfect. When the state takes a person's
property, the owner always has an opportunity to be heard on the proprie-
ty of the seizure. In certain extraordinary situations his hearing may be
postponed until after the seizure, but the important fact is that he will
eventually be heard. But when the state uses deadly force to arrest a fleeing
felony suspect, there is never an opportunity to be heard on the propriety
of the force used. If the suspect is killed, he will never get a hearing at all; if
he is not killed, his trial will only address the question of whether he
committed the felony.
The constitutional impact of this distinction is unclear. There is no
hearing that can remedy an erroneous deprivation of life. Arguably this
means that the governmental need for summary action must be even more
compelling to justify deadly force. On the other hand, it can be contended
that the use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing felon really has no procedur-
al significance at all, and that a balancing test is merely a subterfuge for
substantive due process.2 6
Assuming, however, that a balancing test is proper, it must be deter-
mined what possible governmental interests can outweigh a fleeing felon's
interest in being free from deadly force. Indisputably, one such govern-
mental interest is the protection of the lives of the public. When a fleeing
felon places a policeman's life in present and immediate danger, the officer
has the privilege to shoot in self-defense. Similarly, if the suspect poses a
present threat to the life of some third party bystander, a police officer has
a "defense of others" privilege. In both cases the felon has placed life in
present danger, and the state's interest in protecting life would outweigh
the felon's interest in being free from deadly force.
The Model Penal Code permits the arresting officer to use deadly
force against a fleeing felon when the underlying felony involved the use of
deadly force. 27 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that this was
consistent with due process, and therefore must have concluded that al-
though here the felon poses no present threat to life, the fact that he has
endangered life in the immediate past justifies deadly force to prevent his
escape.
The Model Penal Code also allows the use of deadly force to arrest a
fleeing felon whose escape would create a substantial risk of future harm to
life and limb.28 The Mattis majority's approval of this provision stands for
the proposition that society's interest in preventing future harm to life can
outweigh the felon's present interest in continued life.29 The more difficult
26. The question, after all, is not what procedures a police officer must follow
to execute properly a fleeing felon. The question is what circumstances make it
reasonable for the legislature to authorize deadly force.
27. See note 14 supra.
28. See note 14 supra.
29. It is difficult to conceive of many realistic situations where this provision
(Vol. 42
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questions arise where the fleeing felon, as in Mattis, poses no manifest
threat to life, either past, present, or future. What governmental interests,
if any, can justify the use of deadly force to arrest such a person?
One possibility is the state's interest in the immediate apprehension of
nonviolent felony suspects. If police cannot use deadly force to effect the
arrest of nonviolent felons, some suspects will escape that otherwise would
have been immediately apprehended. 0 The state's interest in the ap-
prehension of criminals, however, is not automatically defeated when a
felon successfully flees from arrest. Often apprehension is merely delayed.
The possible consequences of delayed apprehension are two fold. (1) The
escaped suspect may commit other crimes before he can be apprehended.
(2) The prospect of easy flight from arrest may encourage other individu-
als to commit crimes. Both possibilities share the characteristic of being
extremely difficult to predict in advance; accordingly, the need for im-
mediate apprehension of a given nonviolent fleeing felon may or may not
be compelling. Thus, the need for immediate, as opposed to delayed,
apprehension is inherently speculative, and does not seem to outweigh the
nonviolent suspect's interest in continued life.
A closely related governmental interest is to deter felons from fleeing
arrest. It has been argued that if police could never shoot, law enforcement
would be reduced to a "race. . .to the swift."'" Such predictions, however,
seem greatly exaggerated. The only felon likely to be deterred from fleeing
is one who contemplates the consequences. Such a person will surely realize
that if he runs, he not only looks guilty, but stands a good chance of being
caught. Moreover, the felon may lack confidence in the pursuing officer's
appreciation of due process. And if the state is still determined to deter
felons from fleeing arrest, the traditional means of doing so is to make such
conduct a separate crime,3 2 rather than to permit shooting the offender
dead on the spot.
The state also has a legitimate interest in having a rule that can be
practicably administered by law enforcement officers. Police must make
snap judgments whether to shoot, and courts should not require them to
perform delicate balancing tests before pulling the trigger. To place this
argument in proper perspective, however, one must realize that police
must already run through a mental checklist: Is this a felon or a misde-
meanant? Has he been notified he is under arrest? Is there any way to
would apply without overlapping with the other three privileges mentioned above.
A cynic might conclude that this provision is designed to protect the officer who
shoots first and seeks justification later.
30. "Apprehending" a felon by deadly force does not necessarily involve
killing him. The bullet may wound, graze, or miss entirely and still effectively stop
the felon. However, when the state seeks to justify deadly force, it should be
required to assume that death will in fact result.
31. Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in the Apprehension of Fugitives from
Arrest, 14 MCGILL L.J. 293, 311 (1968).
32. At common law fleeing from arrest was a minor crime.
1977]
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arrest him short of deadly force? The Model Penal Code merely adds a
fourth question: Is this felon a threat to life? Although this is by no means a
simple question to answer, the fact that many police departments have
adopted the Model Penal Code approach through internal regulations
indicates that police officers do not find it all that difficult to administer.
33
In sum, none of the governmental interests in summary deprivation of
life appear to outweigh the nonviolent felon's interest in being free from
deadly force. Therefore, if a balancing test is required by due process, the
Mattis court correctly concluded that the fleeing felon rule embodied in the
Missouri statute is unconstitutional.
The fleeing felon rule is also subject to attack under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The argument is that because deadly force may be exercised to
arrest felons but not to arrest misdemeanants, felons are thereby denied
equal protection. The validity of such an argument turns on the applicable
standard of review. There is probably a "rational basis"3 4 for allowing more
force to arrest felons, because escaped felons generally threaten society
more than escaped misdemeanants. 35 However, if "strict scrutiny"3 6 ap-
plies, the fleeing felon rule is presumptively unconstitutional. The state
would have to demonstrate that the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy is
necessary to achieve some compelling state interest. If the only compelling
state interest is the protection of life, a rule that allows the use of deadly
force against all felons, regardless of whether they threaten life, is clearly
unnecessary to protect life.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mattis held that "strict
scrutiny" was applicable, basing its analysis on the individual's "fundamen-
tal right to life. T37 Although the United States Supreme Court has never
held that the right to life is "fundamental" in the sense of triggering strict
scrutiny, 8 it recently indicated that to be fundamental, a right must be
33. For a discussion of current police firearms policies see Mattis v. Schnarr,
547 F.2d at 1015-16.
34. Under the rational basis standard of review, a statutory classification is
upheld if there is any conceivable reason for the distinctions drawn. See, e.g.,
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961).
35. Courts which have rejected equal protection challenges to the fleeing
felon rule have been none too clear on the applicable standard of review. See Mattis
v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.
Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971). For a discussion of the possibility of a middle
standard see Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 11, at 378-79.
36. Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, a statutory classification is
upheld only if it is proved necessary to achieve some compelling state interest. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. The court, however, applied the fundamental right doctrine in a due
process context.
38. The Mattis majority cited three cases that contained language referring to
the fundamental right to life, but none of these cases involved the fundamental
right doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
[Vol. 42
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"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."39 The fact that
both the fifth and fourteenth amendments forbid deprivation of life with-
out due process would seem to indicate at least "implicitly" that life is
constitutionally guaranteed. However, in light of recent restrictions on the
fundamental rights doctrine,40 the result is far from clear.
Of course, even if the fleeing felon rule violates equal protection, a
legislature could cure all equal protection problems by simply authorizing
the use of deadly force to arrest both felons and misdemeanants. Although
this may be politically unlikely, it demonstrates that the use of deadly force
to arrest nonviolent felons is really not a problem of equal protection. The
real objection to the fleeing felon rule is not that felons and misdemeanants
are treated differently, but that nonviolent criminal suspects are shot at
all.
4 1
The use of deadly force to arrest nonviolent felons has also been
challenged as cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals characterized this as a "good argument" in view of the eighth
amendment's mandate to judges to consider the proportionality and moral
adequacies prescribed for criminal conduct.42 However, other federal
courts have thus far avoided the proportionality question by holding that
the use of deadly force to effect arrest does not constitute "punishment"
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.4 3 These cases apparently
rely on the basic principle that the state cannot legitimately punish a
criminal suspect until he has been convicted by a court of law.
The fact that the state cannot legitimately punish a criminal suspect,
however, does not necessarily mean that all pretrial disabilties imposed by
91, 123, 134-35 (1945) (police beating black youth to death violates due process);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (right to appointment of counsel under
sixth amendment); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (discrimination
against aliens violates equal protection). The court also cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) for the proposition that a viable fetus has a fundamental right to life. Roe
v. Wade actually held that a fetus has no right to life at all because it is not a
fourteenth amendment "person." The Court did, however, indicate that if a fetus
were a person, its right to life would be guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 157.
39. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
40. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no funda-
mental right to education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no fundamental
right to housing). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mattis also stated that
strict scrutiny applied because the Missouri statutes irrebuttably presume that all
fleeing felons pose a threat to life. But cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)
(restricting the irrebuttable presumption doctrine). Disproportionate racial impact
was also mentioned as raising equal protection problems. But cf. Washington v.
Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) (discriminatory purpose must be proved).
41. Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 11, at 379.
42. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1020 n.32.
43. Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Wiley v. Memphis
Policy Dep't, Civil No. C-73-8 (W.D. Tenn., filed June 30, 1975), appeal docketed, No.
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the state are immune to eighth amendment analysis. Federal courts have
often used the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to remedy inade-
quate custodial treatment of pretrial detainees. 44 Moreover, the use of
deadly force to arrest criminal suspects carries strong penal overtones.
When a fleeing suspect is shot dead, it is anomalous to hold that he has not
been punished. He has in fact been apprehended in a manner that effec-
tively accomplishes all that the state ever hoped to accomplish through
punishment.
The trial court in Mattis held alternatively that if the use of deadly
force to effect arrest constitutes punishment, it is not cruel and unusual
when applied to nonviolent fleeing felons. The trial court based its conclu-
sion on the fact that a majority of jurisdictions permit the use of deadly
force to arrest nonviolent felons. 45 Such a statutory survey is a legitimate
tool for eighth amendment analysis, but it is by no means conclusive,
especially when the scope of the privilege under state law is effectively
abrogated by local police regulations. The essential question is whether
deadly force is disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.46 Had
Michael Mattis lived and been convicted of burglary, no court would have
permitted his execution. It is just as disproportionate to sanction his death
without benefit of trial. Thus, if the eighth amendment applies, it would
seem to prohibit the use of deadly force to arrest a nonviolent felon.
A final basis for attacking the fleeing felon rule is the fourth amend-
ment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. Arrest is "quintessentially a
seizure." 47 In police brutality cases courts have occasionally found excessive
force to constitute an unreasonable seizure.4 However, when the force has
been necessary to effect the arrest of a felon, no court has yet held the
seizure to be unreasonable on the ground that it is disproportionate to the
offense. 49 Considerations of proportionality, as well as a balancing of the
interests at stake, would seem to be encompassed within the fourth amend-
ment's rule of reason. Therefore, the fourth amendment is a plausible,
albeit untested, tool for the advocate arguing that the use of deadly force to
arrest a nonviolent felon is unconstitutional.
44. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974); Howell v. Cataldi,
464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
But see Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (detainee beaten by jailor cannot invoke eighth amendment,
but can invoke due process).
45. 404 F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
46. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
47. United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820, 830 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
48. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (an arrest made with
excessive force constitutes an unreasonable seizure); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1970) (policeman's gross negligence in shooting a black youth is an
unreasonable seizure).
49. One court recently dismissed a fourth amendment challenge as "merit-
less." Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, Civil No. C-73-8 (W.D. Tenn. June 30, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 75-2321 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 1975).
(Vol. 42
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